

seems to require that desires represent substantive good, if it is to give an account at odds with subjectivists. Tenenbaum might weaken the analogy further and propose that desires aim at the good by directing action positively towards their objects. But this proposal looks like the transparent interpretation that the scholastic view must rule out if it is to avoid being trivial.

Finally, Tenenbaum might insist that when perverse agents make the bad their good, what they are doing is conceiving of the substantively bad (according to some set of norms) as being substantively good (according to some different set of norms). In this way, he may be able to make space for the notion that desires aim at the good, in a way analogous to beliefs aiming at truth. It is worth noting, though, that the analogy will be imperfect, in so far as we think of truth as unitary, while on this interpretation 'the good' can refer to a variety of goods as indicated by differing sets of norms. I have my reservations that this interpretation properly characterizes perverse agents. Must Satan see doing evil as good in any sense? I concede to Tenenbaum that intelligibility requires us to view Satan's so acting as seeing something worth pursuing in his action, but I am unconvinced that this amounts to more than the transparent interpretation of the good outlined above.

Unfortunately, I have not the space here to do justice to all there is of value in Tenenbaum's discussion. My criticisms are not meant to indicate weaknesses in this challenging book, but rather to demonstrate how much in it is worth considering, and worth pursuing further by anyone interested in the theory of action.

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The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Mark Textor. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2006. Pp. viii + 328. H/b £75.00.

When philosophers in the analytic tradition take up historical questions, they often do so with a systematic interest in mind. This is also true for the contributors to the present volume. They not only inform us about the history of ideas but also try to convince us how much there is still to be learned from the forefathers of Analytic Philosophy. As Mark Textor puts it in his preface: the motive for studying the founding fathers of Analytic Philosophy is 'to improve our grasp of what *we* made of their ideas' (p. 2). But who are the philosophers whose ideas initially inspired the movement known as Analytic Philosophy?

The papers collected in this volume share a common perspective on this question. They reject the standard view that Analytic Philosophy originated as a radically new approach to philosophy from the work of Frege, Russell, and Moore. Instead, they invite us to understand this movement as developing from earlier sources, especially from the work of the 19th century philosophers Bernard Bolzano and Franz Brentano. Analytic Philosophy thus is taken to have important roots in the German-speaking philosophy of the Habsburg Empire known as the 'Austrian tradition in philosophy'. More importantly, however, this approach implies a special focus on those topics that played a prominent role in the work of Bolzano and Brentano: truth, analyticity, intentionality, and consciousness.

These are the four central topics in the present collection. They are supplemented with contributions on related topics in epistemology, political philosophy, and aesthetics. Although each of the contributions stands on its own, there is a pattern running through the entire collection that is noteworthy. It shows itself in a striking contrast in the attitudes taken towards the two central figures: Bolzano and Brentano. While Bolzano is given high credits for the clarity of his work, the strength of his arguments, and the far-sightedness of his views, Brentano's ideas are treated much more critically and are mostly rejected from a contemporary point of view. This should remind us that the term 'contribution', as it is used in the title of this volume, has two different meanings: it can either denote ideas that one takes to be valid; or it can denote ideas that had an important influence despite the fact that they proved to be mistaken.

The two opening papers in this collection discuss ideas of Brentano that the authors evaluate as clearly mistaken, but historically influential. Tim Crane sets the stage by examining Brentano's conception of intentional inexistence put forward in the often-quoted passage in the first volume of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874). As Crane points out, interpretations of this passage are often influenced by conceptions of intentionality that transpired only much later. Such interpretations, he argues, miss the point of what Brentano meant by the intentional inexistence of something in the mind. According to Brentano's original idea, this has to be conceived as a genuine relation between two mental entities whose existence is implied whenever we describe a conscious experience. The only way to make sense of this, Crane suggests, is to think of Brentano as a methodological phenomenalist, that is, as a philosopher who 'brackets' the external world that we normally take for granted. From this perspective, intentional phenomena are not like mental signs of things that may or may not exist outside the realm of conscious experience. They are simply complex mental entities that have mental objects as parts. Crane finds this to be a philosophical confusion that is hard to understand: 'it is hard to see Brentano's discussion of intentionality as something which we can interact usefully today in any depth' (p. 33). However, Crane may exaggerate here a difficulty that is

much easier to resolve. In his *Psychology*, Brentano wanted to avoid a lengthy discussion of sceptical scenarios arising from the fallibility of our senses. That is why he brackets the question whether and how our mind is capable of representing objects in the external world. Even the sceptic will have to grant that there is something 'in' our minds that we are aware of, even when our senses deceive us. For Brentano, talking about intentional inexistent entities is therefore a way of escaping the sceptical gambit: anyone who grants that we have conscious experiences at all will have to grant that they present us with some immanent objects. This does not seem to be such a far-fetched idea as Crane makes it out to be.

Keith Hossack continues the critical appraisal of Brentano by comparing his conception of consciousness — notably his view of inner consciousness — with that of Thomas Reid. Hossack provides three reasons for preferring Reid's view: there is no room for experiential qualia in Brentano's theory, Brentano's identification of an experience with a consciousness of this very experience is 'half-hearted', and Brentano's theory leads to a form of 'anti-realism and idealism' since it takes the notion of appearance to be fundamental (p. 36ff.). Consequently, Hossack rejects Brentano's explanation of inner consciousness as a form of knowledge resulting from judgements that can be distinguished only conceptually but not factually from the experiences they are about. Against this view he insists that judgements and experiences can always come apart, and that there are no judgements whose very nature already guarantees their truth, as Brentano wants to have it (cf. p. 61).

Brentano's conception of truth comes under attack in Peter Simons's contribution to this volume. This paper offers a wide-ranging comparison of different conceptions of truth in Bolzano, Brentano, Marty, Meinong, Husserl, Twardowski, Wittgenstein, Schlick, Neurath, Carnap, and Popper. In this context, Brentano's conception stands out as a radical and idiosyncratic position that was not even accepted by his closest students. Simons finds Brentano's proposal to define truth in terms of evidence unsatisfactory. He locates the main problem in the fact that evidence, according to Brentano, is not given by subjective strength of conviction, which makes it 'something of a mystery as to how we can recognize evidence when we meet it in ourselves' (p. 165). Simons shares with the other contributors to this volume a quite different attitude towards Bolzano's position. Although he does not spare him from criticism either, he finds himself largely in agreement with Bolzano on the main points: Bolzano's theory of truth, he says, 'is a century ahead of its time and still stands up remarkably well to the most rigorous scrutiny' (p. 163).

A perfect example of such rigorous scrutiny is provided by Wolfgang Künne in his essay 'Analyticity and Logical Truth: From Bolzano to Quine'. This paper stands out not just for its length (64 pp.), but also for its depth and attention to detail. It is now widely acknowledged that Bolzano invented a precursor of model theory when he used a procedure of varying

non-propositional components of a proposition to define the notions of validity, analyticity, and deducibility. Künne lays out the fundamental assumptions driving this idea, confronts it with possible counter-examples, and points out consequences that are quite surprising, for example, that ‘a synthetic proposition can entail an analytic proposition’ (p. 194), that ‘of two propositions which necessarily have the same truth-value one may be synthetic and the other analytic’ (p. 195), and that ‘a proposition that is analytic... can be contingent, and it can be the content of a belief that is justifiable only by historical (or other empirical) research’ (ibid). A well-known objection raised by Bolzano’s procedure says that it ‘makes our verdicts as to the analyticity of a proposition dependent on arbitrary features of its linguistic formulation’ (p. 196). Künne puts these critical points to a test in comparing Bolzano’s views with that of Kant, Frege, Carnap, Ajdukiewicz, Quine, Dummett, and Strawson. His verdict is that Bolzano is still a stronghold in these muddy waters. If one rejects Quine’s sceptical stance that we might have to ‘give up defining logical truth along old semantical lines’ (p. 229), we have ‘some incentive for being friendly to propositions’ (p. 231), and for subscribing to an account of analyticity and logical truth ‘in the spirit of Bolzano’ (p. 230).

Equally favourable to Bolzano’s conception of analyticity is Edgar Morscher. He regards analyticity not only as a topic on which there is remarkable agreement, but also as a great divide within the Austrian tradition in philosophy. There is widespread agreement concerning the importance of the analytic–synthetic distinction and about the need for improving Kant’s explication of this distinction. A big divide opens up, however, between Bolzano and Carnap whose theories move in opposite directions. While Carnap draws the line between analytic and synthetic sentences in such a way that all a priori knowable truths fall on the analytic side, Bolzano acknowledges the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge and enlarges the domain of analytic truths in such a way that empirical truths can be analytic as well. For this reason, Morscher assigns him the title of a ‘Super-Kant’.

Benjamin Schnieder makes another strong point in favour of Bolzano in his discussion of the ontology of particularized properties (also called ‘moments’ or ‘tropes’), that is, properties that are only uniquely instantiable. Schnieder compares three arguments that he reconstructs from Meinong, Husserl, and Bolzano for the claim that such properties ‘play an irreducible role in everyday thought and speech’ (p. 131). The first two of these arguments, Schnieder concludes, are not very convincing. By contrast, Bolzano’s argument that relies on the causal role of particularized properties ‘holds under scrutiny’ (p. 145).

The praise for Bolzano finds expression also in a paper dealing with his political philosophy and his views on aesthetics. Rolf George and Paul Rusnock emphasize that Bolzano’s *On the Best State* is far more than an

utopian vision of a civil society that maximizes the well-being of its members. Such an interpretation would reduce Bolzano to a utilitarian philosopher devoted to the 'contemplation of the unattainable' and 'unconcerned with the practical' (p. 265). In fact, George and Rusnock argue that Bolzano had a very concrete vision of educating people by teaching them basic logical tools that should help clarifying their thoughts also on matters of practical interest. He tried to execute this plan in his weekly addresses to the public as a priest and as a university teacher in Prague until the Catholic authorities cancelled his services. 'His successful effort to educate the people of Bohemia', the authors claim, 'adds an important social dimension to the role that philosophy has played in the Habsburg Empire' (p. 288).

So far, I focused on the two key figures in the Austrian tradition that provided the soil on which Analytic Philosophy developed. But there are other philosophers besides Bolzano and Brentano who deserve to be recognized as having prepared this soil. One of them is Alexius Meinong. While the present volume includes no paper on his much discussed object-theory, it contains an excellent discussion of Meinong's theory of memory by Fabrice Terroini. This paper fits into a more general epistemological perspective opened up by Kevin Mulligan's contribution. Mulligan raises the question of which epistemic states may qualify as being 'primitively certain', and he compares the divergent answers to this question that can be found among philosophers of the 19th century. These two papers remind us that combining foundationalism with fallibilism is not a recent invention in epistemology.

Did Austrian philosophers also influence the analytic approach to ethical theory? In this respect, the present volume is not very informative. This gap is partly filled, however, by an interesting paper by Maria Reicher in which she draws attention to another field to which Austrian philosophers made important contributions, namely aesthetics. In particular, she focuses on work by Stefan Witasek and Christian Ehrenfels whose 'views and arguments are still worthy of consideration'. This compliment is also extended to Bolzano's treatment of 'aesthetic fiction' in which he mentions the possibility of an 'eye-music', something that was actually invented only long after Bolzano's death (p. 307).

The present volume will be clearly of interest to anyone in search of an up to date account of the manifold influences that Bolzano and Brentano had on the development of Analytic Philosophy. In addition, the volume can be recommended also to readers with a more specific interest in one of the other topics that is featured in this collection: truth, analyticity, intentionality, consciousness, the ideal state, memory, foundationalism, and the nature of aesthetic values. Historically-minded readers should find the overall pattern that emerges from the way in which Bolzano's and Brentano's influences are evaluated interesting. Is it really true that Brentano's influence was so much greater than that of Bolzano? And is it true that this asymmetry is counterbalanced by the fact that Bolzano's views are more accessible and

more likely to have the truth on their side? These are challenging questions for anyone who turns to these Austrian roots of Analytic philosophy for inspiration.

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The Reflective Life: Living Wisely With Our Limits, by Valerie Tiberius. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. xii + 222. H/b. \$60.00/£35.00.

Given that wisdom is, at least theoretically, the *sin qua non* of philosophy, it is perhaps a bit to our own chagrin that we philosophers speak and write so little about it. It is equally welcome and salutary to see an excellent job done on the topic, and gratitude is the only apt response to Valerie Tiberius's book. The book's focus is practical wisdom, and its central project is an attempt to explicate the theoretical structure that will underlie adequate attempts to answer the question 'How ought I to live?'. And given the subjectivist starting points with which she begins, Tiberius develops what she calls the 'Reflective Wisdom Account' of how to live, how we may 'train the rational and reflective capacities we actually have so that they can function together with our emotions, moods, and desires to get us somewhere we'd like to be' (p. 7). Her methodological assumptions are naturalistic and empirically minded, and she brings to bear on the issues an impressive familiarity with data from studies in positive psychology. This is all laid out with admirable clarity and written in a lucid, engaging style with a keen eye for the telling, informative example, or story, or bit of data. And while I have reservations about her account, to be brought out below, there is simply no doubt that this is an admirable book, truly written in the best spirit of philosophy.

The book is divided into three parts, the first being a discussion of the foundation of the answer to 'How ought I to live?', which Tiberius locates in the first person point of view. She begins with this subjective point of view and builds her Reflective Wisdom Account on it. Unsurprisingly, this is not pure subjectivism, which would be unable to distinguish 'a life lived in accordance with our reflective values' from 'a life that *seems* good to us' (p. 201). While the good life is understood in terms of how well people's lives meet their own subjective standards for 'a good life', the standards themselves are ultimately determined by reflective judgements about what they ought to be.